di Petros Devrikis
On 7 August, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey signed a historic agreement in Mecca aimed at strengthening defence cooperation against common threats. The “Mecca Pact”, a term coined for the deal by various analysts, builds upon a previous bilateral treaty between Riyadh and Islamabad, stipulating that an attack on any of these nations is an attack on all and underscoring the Islamic world’s ambition to reduce security dependence on foreign actors.
The three member states aim to model the bloc after NATO by conducting joint military exercises, establishing institutional structures and accepting new countries, which share similar defence concerns.
Recent regional developments indicate that the Mecca Pact was not created in a vacuum. The war between Iran and the United States revealed significant vulnerabilities in the deterrence of Gulf states despite their active security partnerships with Washington. American preference for Israel exposed Arab states to Iranian strikes and challenged their status as a safe haven in a volatile region, with the energy sector suffering severe repercussions. Furthermore, every country has its individual security concerns. Saudi Arabia wants to halt strikes on its oil facilities and infrastructure from the Iranian-backed Houthis. Turkey is worried about Israel’s hegemonic agenda in the Levant and its persistent attacks on Gaza, Lebanon and Syria. Finally, Pakistan’s primary threat remains India, primarily due to Kashmir’s political status and the 2025 conflict. To add fuel to the fire, New Delhi’s unilateral suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty sparked outrage by Islamabad, which relies on the river system for agriculture and energy production.
The alliance combines three states with unique and complementary capabilities. Saudi Arabia constitutes a financial powerhouse with a vibrant oil industry and ambitious expectations as shown in the kingdom’s Vision 2030 plan. One of the plan’s core tenets is the localisation of defence spending, a goal facilitated by the pact’s creation due to the ability to form joint ventures and collaborate with allied arms enterprises. Turkey is a NATO member state boasting an export-oriented domestic arms industry and an active interventionist policy, having interfered in the conflicts in Syria, Libya and Somalia. Meanwhile, Pakistan is a nuclear state with experienced armed forces, aiming to complement its strategic relationship with China with further security guarantees.
Currently, there is no official roadmap of how another state can join the pact. Egypt has reportedly expressed interest in joining, with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan describing Cairo as a “natural partner”. However, el-Sisi is currently evaluating the bloc’s alignment with the country’s broader geopolitical interests, thus it is in no hurry to join a binding treaty that can contrast with its policies. Compared to the pact’s members, Egypt has warmer relations with Israel and a strategic partnership with Greece, focusing on energy and maritime security, which clashes with Ankara’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) claims. Other potential candidates include Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, with the former two being the most vulnerable to the Iran war and hence the most interested in improving their deterrence mechanisms.
While the trilateral agreement offers certain capacities and opportunities, there are also multiple challenges that will test its effectiveness and resilience. Amid the premature comparisons with NATO, one of the biggest questions is whether the pact can actually resemble the North Atlantic alliance in its doctrine. Specifically, it is unknown yet how the “mutual defence” clause can be implemented in the case of an attack on a member. Vast geographic distances between the members and increased logistics costs prevent large overseas troop buildups, with states reducing their global military footprint to foreign bases or peacekeeping missions. A potential solution to the problem would be the creation of joint rapid reaction forces stationed in all three countries in order to respond quickly to localised conflict outbreaks.
Another important challenge is the reaction by the region’s two main powers; Iran and Israel. Tel Aviv officials have been alarmed by the developments in Mecca and called on to improve relations with Greece, Cyprus, India and the United Arab Emirates to offset any advantages. Meanwhile, Tehran has adopted a more ambiguous position, with Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi officially welcoming the pact’s creation as it signals the need for unity among Muslim countries. However, more hardline politicians interpret the alliance as a “paper agreement”, such as National Security Committee member Ibrahim Rezaei, who said it will not provide Riyadh with any security guarantees, similar to the American military presence. One of Iran’s major concerns is that the pact can turn against the Houthi movement in Yemen, causing another setback for its “Axis of Resistance” following intensive wars in Gaza and Lebanon.
A final point of consideration is the conflict of interests among member states. This is evident by the diverse geopolitical priorities of every country and their varying relations with the United States and Israel. Saudi Arabia has a strategic partnership with Washington and is willing to normalise ties with Tel Aviv if an independent Palestinian state is established. Turkey has enjoyed greater support under the Trump administration, while its formerly vibrant relation with Israel has been severed following the war in Gaza. Finally, Pakistan maintains an ambivalent relation with Washington, which was recently amplified due to Islamabad’s role as a mediator in the Iran conflict, and has no roadmap for recognising Israel, in contrast to its strong bilateral ties with Tehran. To make the most of the alliance and avoid internal strife, Riyadh, Ankara and Islamabad must pursue a unified strategy in an array of issues, whether in defence procurements, relations with foreign countries or meditation in conflicts.
In conclusion, the Mecca Pact raises several questions about its institutional evolution and response to regional security challenges. While intending to reduce dependence on foreign security providers, its effectiveness is contingent on the member states’ ability to coordinate defence strategies and translate shared objectives into decisive policy.
