Petros Devrikis
Amid constant instability in the Middle East, there is no other Gulf state that has attempted to alter regional power balances as much as the United Arab Emirates. By employing an array of policies, ranging from active intervention in neighbouring civil wars to fostering diplomatic ties with former adversaries, Abu Dhabi seeks to radically transform the region, install friendly governments in fragile countries and enhance its position as a global financial hub. However, 2026 has been a disastrous year for the Emirati authorities so far, due to the setbacks for pro-UAE forces in Yemen and Sudan and the financial implications of the war in Iran.
The foreign policy shift can be traced back to the end of the Cold War when the United States emerged as the world’s only superpower. Abu Dhabi improved its military relations with Western countries and participated in various wars in the following decades; Persian Gulf, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan etc. With the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011, the Emiratis took advantage of the deteriorating situation in Libya, supported the Syrian opposition against the Assad regime and established military presence in southern Yemen, particularly to function as a bulwark against the Iranian-backed Houthis and the Saudi-backed central government. Furthermore, they supported Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s military coup against the Islamist Morsi government in Egypt, pledging tens of billions in ambitious investments and serving as a critical financial lifeline to Cairo.
The interventionist policy by the UAE varied and achieved different results by country. In Egypt, Abu Dhabi managed to find a valuable ally in combatting political Islam and committed to providing financial and military support despite el-Sisi’s authoritarian rule. In Libya, the outbreak of a second civil war in 2014 led the Emirates to consider assisting Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) against the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA). However, the war ended without a clear winner and both sides formed a government of national unity in 2021. In Syria, the Gulf’s support for the Islamic opposition backfired following the capture of Aleppo by the Syrian Arab Army (SAA), forcing the Emiratis to begin normalising relations with Damascus and sharing their opposition to radical Islam. Finally, Yemen proved to be a difficult case, since the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) largely failed to retake the territory of former South Yemen.
By the end of the 2010s, Abu Dhabi had a stable presence in every neighbouring conflict. Coupled with the election of Donald Trump in the United States in 2017 and the beginning of a “maximum pressure” campaign directed at Iran, the Emirates began negotiating with Israel to normalise bilateral ties and signed the Abraham Accords alongside Bahrain in 2020. The agreements drew condemnation by many Arab countries because of their failure in resolving the Palestinian issue, however the Gulf states did not withdraw from the accords during the Gaza war in 2021, effectively indicating their indifference for the Palestinian losses and their statehood struggle. Furthermore, the Emiratis maintained relations with Tel Aviv in the aftermath of the 2023 war, emphasising the need to confront Hamas and Iranian influence.
In the same year, a civil war broke out in Sudan between the central government and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary organisation led by General Hemedti. The United Arab Emirates rushed to support the RSF, with which they have had ties since the overthrow of former leader Omar al-Bashir in 2019. Through supply lines in the neighbouring countries (Libya, Chad, Ethiopia), the group can evade the international arms embargo imposed on Khartoum since 2023. This explains why Hemedti advanced through the capital in the first years, before being pushed out by the Sudanese Armed Forces in 2026. It should be noted that the RSF is notorious for war crimes in Darfur and various illicit activities, with Khartoum directly accusing Abu Dhabi of receiving smuggled gold from Sudan and lobbying foreign governments to designate the group as a terrorist organisation.
In recent years, Abu Dhabi has experienced multiple setbacks in its regional policy. In December 2024, the Assad administration in Syria was overthrown by Ahmed al-Sharaa’s HTS, leading the Emiratis to reconsider their warm relations with Damascus due to their stance against political Islam. Yemen became a similar case last December when the separatist STC launched a large offensive in an attempt to retake all territory of former southern Yemen and declare independence. The offensive was initially successful and forced the Yemeni government to retreat toward northern positions. Nevertheless, with the start of the new year, Saudi Arabia launched air strikes on STC positions in Aden and supported a wide counterattack by the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), which led to the fall of Aden and the exile of STC leader Aidarus al-Zoubaidi to the UAE. However, the biggest challenge was the start of the war in Iran in late February. With the US-Israeli attack on Tehran killing dozens of senior Iranian officers, Iran responded by targeting Gulf countries hosting US assets, including the Emirates. Key affected facilities were the Fujairah port, the Abu Dhabi and Dubai airports and the Al Dhafra air base, damaging the country’s reputation as a safe heaven in a volatile region.
Overall, the foreign policy of the United Arab Emirates seems to have backfired from its original ambitions despite the heavy use of hard power. The war in Iran and the retreats in Sudan and Yemen force Abu Dhabi to recalculate its foreign interventions and turn to diplomatic means for resolving regional conflicts.
